Posts
Chido Makunike
The details of the recent traditional marriages of two
prominent men of power in Zimbabwe
may provide some interesting clues to why so much of Africa
has failed to rid itself of the ‘big man syndrome.’ Even if a leader is
initially elected, all too often he has become powerful beyond what is
constitutionally allowed, and has stayed on long after his people are tired of
him. While the character of many who have become leaders in modern Africa
may be questionable, there are also considerable cultural and social pressures
that encourage the emergence of the ‘big man’ mentality once a person gets into
a position of power.
Despite formally embracing political governance structures
based on those of the Western world, many African countries have struggled to
adhere to some important aspects of them, which has then prevented the full,
successful application of many others. The result is that while on the surface today’s African
governments look very similar to those of the former colonial powers from which
they inherited them, in fact they don’t much function the same.
‘Poor governance and poor leadership’ are the sweeping,
non-specific reasons usually given for Africa’s many problems in the
application of government systems which are responsive and subordinate to the
wishes and interests of the people. But are there perhaps also intrinsic aspects
of the societies that so often produce these ‘bad leaders’ that may contribute
to the problem of the frequent emergence of the African ‘big man,’ and all the
consequential problems his style of ruling then brings?
One of the most problematic ideals to apply is that the
leader of the country is not an all-powerful chief or king, but is supposed to
be a servant of the people and to serve or go at their pleasure.
Many African leaders who started off with the affection and good
will of their people then became stereotypical ‘big men’ over time. Among the
characteristics of the ‘syndrome’ are increasing contempt for and repression of
their people, dubious elections, helping themselves to the country’s resources
and so forth. Where a ‘big man’ rules, the checks and balances that are
supposed to make the modern system of government work optimally cannot be
applied. The results of this are all too familiar to many Africans.
Recently Zimbabweans have had a welcome break from the
constant barrage of mostly negative political news. Two prominent men of power
in their middle ages have recently each married for the second time. As is the
norm, they married according to African custom, and will then have civil
marriages. This is one of countless ways that Africans have found an
accommodation between their traditional ways of doing things and those
introduced since European colonization. While there are many areas in which
such attempted accommodations produce clashes between the two cultural worlds
in which many Africans now live, in this case it generally, mostly works out
smoothly.
Chief of the Zimbabwe
defense forces, Constatine Chiwenga, reportedly got traditionally married in
October 2011. In mid-November Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai reportedly did
the same, although there then followed baffling confusion over whether what he
is said to have participated in was a marriage or something less than that.
While there is increasing discussion about the ‘modern’
appropriateness of lobola/roora/bride price, it is a deeply embedded cultural
practice. The nature of what may be demanded as bride price may be constantly
changing (e.g. from cows to cell phones, cash, cars, etc) but the idea of it
remains firmly rooted.
There are increasing accusations that the idea of bride
price being a cultural, symbolic token of the joining together of two families
has become corrupted. Some argue that it has become ‘commercialized;’ a chance
for some families to ‘profiteer’ by almost seeming to be ‘selling’ their
daughters.
Most of the discussion is good-natured and accepts that
while abuses do occur and that many concessions to ‘modernity’ must be
constantly made, roora/lobola is a deep part of most African societies, and
indeed of most others in one form or other.
Who is to define what is an abuse of roora/lobola, after
all? As long as an amicable compromise is reached between the two families in
bride price negotiations, it is in theory of no concern to anyone else whether
the idea of it as merely a token or a symbol has been abused.
Except that what the prominent in society do may be seen by
many as setting the standard, which others may then try to emulate, for better
or for worse.
According to media reports, Chiwenga paid US$47,000 in bride
price, Tsvangirai US$36,000. In a country where the average civil servant,
among the few classes of people with formal employment, earns less than US$500
per month, these sums are small fortunes.
In these two cases it could easily be said that all that
matters is the willingness and ability of the men concerned to pay what is
asked. Both men are accomplished in their respective careers and are of middle
age, in their 50s. In these and many other ways their circumstances are quite
different from those of most men who would be getting married.
But part of the online discussion about these reported huge
sums of money for bride price is whether the examples of these two men will not
give unrealistic ideas to families marrying their daughters to men of far more
modest means. Will there not now be a sort of bride price inflation?
Interesting as that is, that is not the focus here. Rather,
it is how, contrary to any feeling of being vaguely extorted, the men may view
their payment of these staggering amounts of money in bride price as part of
showing their ‘bigness.’ In terms of showing off means and social status, it is
one way of separating the ‘men’ from the ‘boys.’
Yet despite their social and political importance, neither
of these two men have known sources of wealth. In terms of their ability to pay
big sums in bride price this may not be terribly relevant, since for one thing,
being powerful men, they would have no shortage of well-wishers willing, even
eager to help them in this and many other respects. And of course they could
have lucrative, legitimate businesses and investments no one knows about.
Yet there is no escaping the discomforting point that the
men making these fantastic splashes of wealth, for all their prominence, are
basically lowly paid public servants. As far as the public knows, they are not
successful, rich businesspeople.
These two public servants may have their own private sources
of wealth. But could others wanting to marry without access to large private
piggy banks be tempted to abuse their positions in order to keep up the
appearance of being ‘big’ in society?
There is a mysterious but inescapable link in much of Africa
(and many places elsewhere) between holding high political office and access to
wealth. Many Africans grumble at this obvious link, but many almost accept it
as a given. People may be suspicious of how after just a few years in office a
lowly-paid but high-ranking official may be able to splash money around like a
business mogul. On the other hand, if the high official does not act and live
‘big,’ he is seen as a disappointment to at least his clan and immediate
circle, who expect to somehow materially benefit from their patron’s high
office, regardless of how poorly paid it is.
In other words, the person faces considerable social
pressure within his immediate circle (which may have a big social and cultural
diameter) to act/look/live ‘big.’
It is not far-fetched to imagine how a ‘big’-but-lowly-paid official
may succumb to these pressures by finding innovative ways to use his position
to augment his income, in order to meet the material expectations of ‘bigness’
expected of him. Once that sets in, there is no easy retreat for him. There are
risks of being suspected and exposed, but they are minimized by many others of
his rank being in a similar game.
If his position is elected, the many ‘extra’ benefits of the
job, which may vastly exceed his humble salary, are simply too lucrative to
give up. Ways to thwart the electoral process become very tempting. The voters
complain bitterly against corruption in high places, but they also expect
regular ‘gifts’ from the ‘big man’ at election time, never asking where he
could possibly get the money to fund those electioneering alms.
For the big man, the electoral corruption may involve the
dubious sourcing of the money for his expensive campaign, ‘gifts’ for the
voters included; the employment of dirty tricks against the opposition and if
the big man is big enough, to outright fix the election results. He is no
longer just fighting for his continued personal access to the many ‘extra’
benefits of his high office, but also on behalf of the many hangers-on who
depend for their well-being on his bigness, which is directly linked to his
position.
For him and those supporters, his hanging on to the position
by any means necessary becomes almost a matter of life and death. Methods that
are seen as excessive and anti-democratic by people at a distance, are seen by
the big man’s inner circle and supporter-beneficiaries as being quite justified
given what is at stake for them. For him and his supporters, there may be no
even remotely similar opportunities available than those afforded by his
position and his access to the many associated perks, official and unofficial,
which are what make him ‘Mr. Big.’
The ‘big man’ syndrome is at least partly a remnant of
traditional relations between office holders and ‘ordinary’ people that in many
cases clash with modern expectations of those relations. In modern theory the
office holder, especially if elected, is the servant of the people. Yet in the
traditional setting the ‘office holder,’ usually by inheritance, is often the
unquestioned master of the people. Humbleness in living or manner may be taken
as a weakness, whereas in an idealistic democratic setting that may be
considered as a positive.
All African societies are to varying extents on some
continuum between old indigenous ways of doing things and the new ways brought
with European colonization. The constitution of a country may be 99% European-derived,
but how it can be applied will be very different in a society that is socially
and culturally perhaps 30% Euro-influenced and 70% indigenous-traditional.
It is actually quite astonishing how quickly and well most
African societies make a successful accommodation between the traditional and
the imported, whether on issues of governance or anything else. This is
particularly so when it is taken into account how quick and overwhelming
colonization was, how ‘different’ much of what it brought was, and how ardently
it often tried to ridicule and destroy what existed.
However, it is perhaps also not surprising that there still
many areas, systems of governance included, where there are often harsh clashes
between imported and traditional values and practices.
Africa has had its share of cynical,
self-serving individuals who worked themselves to positions of power, with
calamitous results for their countries. But in at least some cases, the ‘big
man’ who goes from just being egotistical and self-serving, to then being
repressive and destructive may not have been born that way, but may be molded
into it by the often conflicting, confusing expectations of societies in rapid
transition.
0 comments:
Post a Comment